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NOTES
ANNULMENT IN FLORIDA
Annulment means, literally, to abrogate, nullify or abolish, and
when-specifically applied to marriage connotes the non-existence of
any marital relationship by reason of some impediment existing at the
time of the ceremony.' The Florida Legislature has amply provided
for the dissolution of the marital status by way of divorce 2 but has
left to the judiciary the problems of annulment. As a result, the Florida
Supreme Court has developed solutions in the traditional common
law manner. These appear to suffer from over-emphasis on the equities
of the individual cases at the expense of principles consistently applied;
but by no means should one jump from this observation to the conclusion either that the results are undesirable or that a statute will
readily afford a satisfactory answer to the difficulties.
Decrees of annulment have not been numerous in Florida when
compared with divorces; and as a practical matter they have been
largely reserved for those instances in which other forms of relief are
inadequate yet the nature of the particular marriage strongly urges
dissolution. 8 Only a few types of marriage are specifically prohibited
or voided by statute; 4 accordingly, in granting annulments for other
impediments the bench has enunciated the old common law doctrines. 5
Florida, 6 like other jurisdictions, 7 has adopted the traditional division
of annullable marriages into two categories: void and voidable. Clearcut delineation of these may be possible theoretically, but the lines
become blurred and wavy when superimposed upon the actual decisions. In any event, however, the very least that can be accomplished
Kxzmmo, MAnJua iAD x DEvoncg 1211 (3d ed., Morland, 1946).
FLA. STAT. c. 65 (1949).
E.g., Titcomb v. Titcomb, 160 Fla. 320, 34 So.2d 742 (1948); Cooper v.
Cooper, 120 Fla. 607, 163 So. 35 (1935); Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So.
836 (1935); cf. Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929).
4
FLA. CONsT. Art. XVI, §24 (miscegenation prohibited); FLA. STAT. 1§741.11,
741.12 (1949) (miscegenetic marriages made a crime and declared void);
H1741.21, 741.22 (incestuous marriages made a crime); §799.01 (bigamy made a
crime but marriage not declared void). See note 34 infra, however.
5
E.g., Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 138 So. 775 (1932).
Old.; cf. Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935); Ponder v. Graham,
4 Fla. 23, 30 (1851).
7See 1 VElunm, AmmucAx Fm ry LAws 150 (1931).
2

(339)
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by analyzing the cases is to demonstrate the existing confusion and
to indicate the impracticability of such a classification.
THE VOID-VOMABLE DIVISION

In the leading case of Kuehmsted v. Turnwall,8 the Florida Supreme
Court in holding the marriage under attack void reiterated in summary
fashion the standard common law distinctions between void and voidable marriages. These follow from an assumed basic premise that a
void marriage is wholly without validity ab initio, while a voidable
marriage is good for all purposes until voided. The former presupposes
at all times the non-existence of any marital relationship. The purported marriage may be attacked by anyone in any direct or collateral
proceeding in which the marital status is material, 9 in any civil court, 10
and at any time, whether before or after the death of either purported
spouse" or of both. 12 The survivor takes nothing; 13 and the children
are illegitimate.14 Indeed, a decree of annulment is not required to
render the marriage a nullity, although upon request one will be
granted for the purpose of removing doubts as to whether marriage
was in fact contracted. 15 A voidable marriage, on the other hand, can
only be attacked in a direct proceeding brought during the life of
both spouses. 16 Neither can remarry unless the relationship is
judicially dissolved. 17 Upon the death of either spouse, the survivor is
8103 Fla. 1180, 1185, 138 So. 775, 777 (1932). After divorce the ex-husband,
upon hearing of his ex-wife's probably fatal illness, rushed to Florida and remarried her while she was mentally unbalanced, obviously for the sole purpose of
inheriting. On attack by the heirs after her death the marriage was held void on
the ground of her lack of capacity to enter into this second marriage.
9Ibid.
'0 See Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 1183, 138 So. 775, 777 (1932).
"lE.g., Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 835, 26 So.2d 901 (1946) (both spouses
living); Ellenwood v. Ellenwood, 157 Fla. 640, 26 So.2d 655 (1946) (husband
dead).
12See Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23, 30 (1851).
13 E.g., Savage v. Olson, 151 Fla. 241, 9 So.2d 363 (1942).
14 Compare Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So.2d 279 (1942), with Jones v.
Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935), and In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777,
32 So.2d 840 (1947).
ItKuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 138 So. 775 (1932). Even a void
marriage can, however, produce disastrous effects property-wise for the heirs when
innocent third parties are induced to rely on its validity, Kerivan v. Fogel, 156
Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945).
16 See note 12 supra.
17 E.g., Tyson v. State, 83 Fla. 7, 90 So. 622 (1922).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 4

NOTES
entitled to all the rights of husband or wife; 18 and the children are
legitimate. 19 A decree of annulment is essential to dissolution; and
even when it is granted the children are legitimate and acquire rights
20
accordingly, including that of succession.
From the foregoing discussion certain relationships appear. At one
extreme is the void marriage, a nullity in all respects. At the other lies
the marriage terminable only by divorce, which even after dissolution
remains fully effective in all the incidents that preceded its end. Somewhere in between sprawls the voidable marriage, a hybrid subject to
annulment, a status valid until dissolved by affirmative action, and
even then invalidated ab initio in some respects only- the children,
for example, remain legitimate. Viewed from another approach, the
impediment upon which annulment is predicated must exist at the
time of the marriage; if it comes into existence later, it cannot serve
as a basis for annulment.2 1 An impediment existing at the date of
marriage can later be rendered ineffective as a bar, however, by
ratification of the marriage-at least in instances of voidable
22
marriage.
Vom MARUAGES

Incompetency. At common law, marriage to a lunatic is void, 23 the
reason being that an insane person is incapable of comprehending
the marital relationship, whether regarded as a contract or a status
or a cross between the two. As might be expected, the judiciary has
been confronted from time to time with the bothersome question of
what degre of abnormality constitutes insanity; and a categorical
answer is still lacking. As might also be expected, the Supreme Court
of Florida has extended the notion to cover "mental incapacity," even
though its degree may not be so extreme as to warrant commission to
an asylum.
In Kuehmsted v. Turnwal, 24 for example, the bride was at death's
door, suffering from severe physical pain and in a coma at intervals;
and the marriage was held void because of her lack of capacity to
IsSee note 12 supra.
19
E.g., Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 886 (1935).
20
E.g., In re Ruffs Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So.2d 840 (1947).
2
'E.g.,
Bennett v. Bennett, 157 Fla. 627, 26 So.2d 650 (1946).
22
E.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 123 Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936).
23
KEEzEn, op. cit. supra note 1, §212.
24
See note 8 supra.
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enter into the relationship. Similarly, in Savage v. Olson "-5 the marriage was voided because the wife ". . . couldn't exercise rational
judgment concerning a subject so serious as marriage." In each of
these cases the Court may well have been influenced by the patent
fraud practised by the husband; but the attack, which was made by
the heirs after the death of the wife, would have been unavailing on
26
this ground alone.
In Green v. Green,27 on the other hand, the petition for annulment
brought by a girl of fourteen before cohabitation on the ground that
she ". . . knew nothing of the heavy responsibilities incident to the
marital status . . ." but without any allegation of fraud or duress, was
denied. The opinion confuses the old common law test of puberty,
which is of course purely physical, with the mentality required to
comprehend the nature and responsibilities of the marital relationship.
The precise difference in understanding between an emotionally unbalanced woman of sixty-four2 8 and a child of fourteen has not as yet
been explained by the bench.
A periodically insane person marrying during a lucid interval
contracts a valid marriage; confinement to an asylum at the time of
suit for annulment is immaterial. 29
Bigamy. A bigamous marriage is void at common law " and in all
probability in Florida,3' although some confusion exists. By statute
"-'5151 Fla. 241, 246, 9 So.2d 363, 365 (1942). A prior criminal of 46 mramed
a rather wealthy woman aged 64, sickly and given to weeping fits. At his request
the marriage was kept secret. Within two months their car plunged into a canal,
he escaped unharmed but she perished. Ie immediately obtained letters of administration and emptied her safe deposit boxes. Her heirs attacked the marriage,
although actual insanity on her part was not claimed,
2lThcre was also evidence that Savage was a bigamist, but as his alleged first
wife vxas not before the Court it declined decision of this issue.
2777 Fla. 101, 80 So. 739 (1919).
28
See note 25 supra.
29
E.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 157 Fla. 627, 26 So.2d 650 (1946) (wife in insane
asylum at institution of unsuccessful attack by son of deceased husband, but lucid
at time of marriage). The strong influence of equity is indicated by the statement
at 629, 26 So.2d at 651, that "...
it would require a much stronger showing [b,
the heirl than if raised by one of the spouses." Logically there shomld be no difference; insanity is insanity, whoever proves it.
a"KEEzEa, op. cit. supra note 1, §225.
31
E.g., Ellenwood v. Ellenwood, 157 Fla. 640, 26 So.2d 655 (1946). Todd '.
Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So.2d 279 (1942); Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So.
836 (1935). But see Beidler v. Beidler, 43 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1949).
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bigamy is made a crime, but the marriage is not declared void. "
Another statute provides that in the event of divorce on the ground
of bigamy ".... the marriage shall be invalid from the beginning and
the issue illegitimate .... "33
Doubts have been expressed on occasion as to whether a bigamous
marriage is a nullity in all respects; 3 4 but in the recent case of Ellenwood v. Ellenwood35 an innocent second wife was summarily removed
as administratrix upon proof that her deceased husband had a first
wife living and still married to him at the time of his second marriage.

Had it been merely voidable, attack after his death would have been
impossible.
VOmABLE MAnRBAGES

Fraud.As a general rule a marriage motivated by the fraud of one
of the spouses is voidable; 36 and this doctrine is followed in Florida.37
Annulment on this ground has proved particularly effective in defeating unscrupulous schemers who regard marriage as nothing more
than a means of obtaining a comfortable living, and who have succeeded in trapping an individual regarded by the law as in his right
mind.3 8 If either spouse is dead, however, this ground furnishes no
32

FLA. STAT. §799.01 (1949).

33

§65.05 (1949).
E.g., Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 135, 9 So.2d 279 (1942) (husband held
liable for support of child though wife granted divorce on ground of his bigamy):
"Inasmuch as the legislature made paragraph nine [bigamy] a ground for divorce
it expressly recognized that the ceremony possessed some requisites of a marital
status." See also the dissent of Brown, J., in Goldman v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408,
414, 179 So. 715, 717 (1938), and the opinion of Davis, 0.J., in Worman v.
Worman, 113 Fla. 233, 235, 152 So. 435, 486 (1933).
35157 Fla. 640, 26 So.2d 655 (1946).
301 VE~mma, AzmEucA FtAmLy LAws §50 (1931).
37
See note 39 infra; Ball v. Ball, 160 Fla. 601, 36 So.2d 172 (1948); Tyson v.
State, 83 Fla. 7, 90 So. 622 (1922); see Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 46 So.2d 602,
603 (Fla. 1950).
38
E.g., Titcomb v. Titcomb, 160 Fla. 320, 34 So.2d 742 (1948) (widow of 44,
earning $200 monthly as a nurse, married retired man 84; after two years of
spending his money she sought the house and a handsome separate maintenance;
his counterclaim for annulment based on fraud was allowed); Cooper v. Cooper,
120 Fla. 607, 163 So. 35 (1935) (W, a divorcee, wanted only stocks of H-2,
which she obtained though never cohabiting with him; later she sought divorce,
but his counterclaim for annulment was granted on appeal). But when the misrepresentation is mutual and neither spouse deceives the other, there is no fraud
FLA. STAT.

34
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relief, even though it may well prompt the chancellor to reach a solution by finding "mental incapacity" at the time of marriage.3 9 Furthermore, since the marriage is merely voidable rather than void, the fraud
can be condoned, usually by cohabitation after its discovery. 40
Incest. Here again our statutes have caused confusion. Incestuoub
marriages are prohibited and made a crime; 4I but, although Section
741.22 prescribes strict penalties for those marrying ". . within the
degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited or
declared by law to be incestuous and void," nowhere is there any such
law declaring them void. Furthermore, divorce is made available to
42
terminate marriages of this type.
In 1924 the Court at least indicated that an incestuous marriage
was void, apparently following the reasoning applied to bigamy;4 3 but
44
in 1935, in Johnson v. Landefeld, it held that:
"While the statutes of Florida forbid the marriage of a man to
his niece, the statutes also make such marriage a ground for
divorce a vinculo matrimonii; therefore, such a marriage is not
void, but only voidable."
From this the odd result follows that if a widower should marry his
daughter and die, she would be subject to criminal prosecution and
yet would civilly remain his wife. It may be that the Legislature
from the standpoint of annulment, Goldman v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715
(1938).
39
E.g., Savage v. Olson, 151 Fla. 241, 9 So.2d 363 (1942); Kuehmsted v.
Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 138 So. 775 (1932).
40
E.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 123 Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936). A middle-aged
Spanish lady desirous of American citizenship engaged in extra-curricular activities
with a University of Florida law student, of interests not exclusively academic,
and by a plea of pregnancy persuaded him to marry her. Her pregnancy proved to
be purely cerebral, but cohabitation continued for several days after he discovered
this fact. The Court was not unanimous in holding this familiar form of entrapment fair hunting, but all agreed that the cohabitation constituted ratification.
Cf. Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935).
41
FLA. STAT. §§741.21, 741.22 (1949). The prohibition includes relatives by
lineal consanguinity, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, and nephews and
nieces, but not cousins. Cf. McCaskill v. State, 55 Fla. 117, 45 So. 843 (1908).
2

4 FL. STAT. §65.04 (1949).
43

See Capps v. State, 87 Fla. 388, 100 So. 172 (1924), in the syllabus by the
Court. See also CARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 8, §7.
44138 Fla. 511, 513, 189 So. 666 (1939).
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approves of this outcome, but some definite expression of policy, as
in the case of miscegenation, 45 is desirable.
RATICATION

In theory, at least, a voidable marriage can be ratified, thereby
removing the impediment as a bar, while a void marriage cannot.
Again, however, the distinction does not fit the cases. Cohabitation
following a bigamous marriage is of no assistance, even to the duped
spouse, in attempting to assert the validity of the marriage.46 Yet
cohabitation following marriage while mentally incapacitated on a
drunken spree saves the union, even at the behest of a prostitute-wife
who remains reasonably sober. 47 Indeed, in the latter case we find
the statement that ".... a marriage invalid, at the time, for want of

mental capacity, may be ratified and made valid afterwards by any
acts or conduct which amount to a recognition of its validity."4 8 And
yet a woman who marries while drugged can secure annulment on
the ground of lack of capacity to contract marriage at the material
time. 49 As Chief Justice Chapman put the matter: "The mental capacity
requisite to a valid marriage is a capacity to understand the nature of
the contract and the duties and responsibilities it creates." 50 All of
the foregoing, with their varying results, are, in theory, void marriages.
In Jones v. Jones5 ' W married H-1 in Pennsylvania; she left him
and married H-2 in Florida. Later H-1 died; and a year afterward,
unknown to H-2, she went through the mechanics of getting a divorce
in Florida from H-1. H-2 subsequently sued for divorce on the ground
of extreme cruelty, but upon discovering the foregoing facts he sought
annulment instead. The Court held that continuation of cohabitation
by H-2 and W after the death of H-1 amounted to common law marriage, but that this was voidable by H-2 because of the original fraud
at the time of the ceremonial marriage. He thereby secured annulment,
and yet the children of this second wedlock were rendered legitimate.
On the void-voidable theory, the reasoning is as illogical as the result
45
See
46

note 4 supra.
E.g., Ellenwood v. Elenwood, 157 Fla. 640, 26 So.2d 655 (1946).
47
Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 781 (1895).

481d. at 690, 18 So. at 785.
49
Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 835, 26 So.2d 901 (1946).
50
See Martin v. Martin, 157 Fla. 835, 836, 26 So.2d 901 (1946) (concurring
opinion).

51119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935).
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is sound. The marriage to H-2, being void, could not be ratified. Therefore there were two distinct marriages to him: the first, a purportedly
legal though bigamous union; and the second, a legal though common
law marriage. The second began at the death of H-i. Yet at that
moment W became a widow and was eligible to remarry; no impediment existed unless one regards an undisclosed widowship as a ground
for dissolution.
Goldman v. Dithrich5 2 furnishes another example of judicial exertion
to square result with theory. W lived with H-I in West Virginia, which
did not recognize common law marriage, until his death. Thereupon,
allegedly to legitimize her daughter, she promptly went through a
"marriage" ceremony with him, his role being played by her son-inlaw, H-2. There was no cohabitation with H-2. W thereafter moved to
Florida and married H-3, from whom she claimed the right to inherit
upon his death. His heirs secured a decree of annulment in Florida;
but W, undaunted, returned to West Virginia and readily secured
annulment of her marriage to H-2. A petition for rehearing, in which
W alleged the decree annulling the West Virginia marriage, was denied
by the Florida chancellor. On appeal from the final decree and the
order denying the petition for rehearing, W successfully contended
before the Florida Supreme Court that no reason existed for annulling
her marriage to H-3. All agreed that the law of West Virginia governed
marital status entered into there, with the result that her marriage to
H-2, being merely voidable, was valid until entry of the decree annulling it. The majority thereupon declared the purported marriage to
H-2 in the name of H-1 a jest that deceived neither spouse and left
her free to marry H-3 legally in Florida. Her daughter by H-I was
accordingly rendered legitimate by the mock marriage to H-2 under
West Virginia law, but its bogus nature insulated from attack by the
heirs of H-3 her right to inherit from him in Florida. Once again the
tale had a happy ending, although the majority was forced by the
logic of the void-voidable categorization to declare void under Florida
law a marriage merely voidable under the law of West Virginia, which
would have governed if the sham marriage had been accepted as real
by the Florida Court.
The point of the foregoing discussion is that if the decisions square
with the popular notion of fairness and can therefore be termed sound,
and yet the theory allegedly applied either compels strained reasoning
or is disregarded, then perhaps there is something wrong with the
theory itself.
52131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715 (1938).
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JUIJSDICTION

When both spouses appear in an annulment suit, there is no jurisdictional problem; the familiar equity in personam control suffices.5 3
Neither is there any difficulty on this score when a surviving spouse
and the contesting heirs are before the court.
When, however, only one of two living spouses is present and
constructive service is employed, the so-called marital res must be
within the jurisdiction; and this prerequisite entails residence. 54 In
divorce proceedings of this nature, the complainant must be domiciled
within the jurisdiction. 55 It has been held elsewhere that a period of
residence prescribed by statute as the minimum evidence of domicile
for purposes of divorce does not necessarily govern suits for annulment,5 ( but this precise point has not as yet been decided by the
Supreme Court of Florida. The minimum residence required to establish domicile for divorce proceedings in Florida is a scant ninety days
preceding the filing of the bill of complaint. 57 Whether any lesser
period will suffice for in rem - or quasi in rem - jurisdiction to annul
is problematical. Ninety days' residence is in itself scarcely strong
evidence of domicile. There is always the danger that lack of jurisdiction may prove fatal elsewhere to a Florida annulment decree; and
jurisdiction is essential to the application of the full faith and credit
mandate.55
5

31t has been argued that the courts of the place of celebration alone have
jurisdiction to annul, Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 806 (1919); 26 MIcH. L. REv. 211 (1927). The great weight of judicial
authority and most writers, however, recognize the jurisdiction of the courts of the
domicile to annul and, at least inferentially, consider the jurisdictional question to
be identical with that of divorce, e.g., Gwin v. Gwin, 219 Ala. 552, 122 So. 648
(1929); Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 175 Atl. 574 (1934); Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912); BIsHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE
AND SEPARATION §73 (1891); CArSON, LAw OF THE FAmILY, MARRIAGE AND
DIvoRcE 122 (1950); McMurray, Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a Marriage
Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country, 18 CAnnw. L. Rzv. 105 (1930).
See5 also cases cited in Note, 128 A.L.R. 61 (1940).
4See Bemis v. Loftin, 127 Fla. 515, 520, 173 So. 683, 685 (1937).
55

For an exhaustive recent treatment of this subject see Haslup, Divisible

Divorce, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 145 (1950).
GGMillar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917); Montague v. Montague,
25 S.D. 471, 127 N.W. 639 (1910).
57
FLA. STAT. §65.02 (1949).
58

U. S. CONST. Art. IV, §1; cf. Haslup, Divisible Divorce, 3 U. oF FLA. L. REV.
145 (1950).
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The absence of W-1 led the Court to decline to pass on the bigamy
issue raised in Savage v. Olson,5 9 although no mention was made of this
factor in Ellenwood v. Ellenwood.6 ° In Goldman v. Dithrich6 ' the
West Virginia annulment of the purported second marriage was disregarded by Florida; the marriage was a mere jest in the first place,
and no jurisdiction to annul it existed. To be safe, it is suggested that
the divorce residence period be observed in annulment proceedings
involving constructive service, 62 not because the statute is necessarily
applicable, but rather because ninety days is a low minimum for the
establishment of domicile.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent, in the final analysis, that there are no clear-cut
principles of annulment in Florida. Nevertheless, this branch of the
law is of sufficient importance to warrant careful thought. Statistics
show that the ratio of annulments to divorces has more than doubled
since 1927, and is now leveling off at approximately one percent. 3
Several grounds are available, of which fraud and misrepresentation is
64
most frequently used, with bigamy a close second.
Bigamy will probably remain in a class by itself; the Occidental
male, barely capable of coping with one wife at a time, is horrified at
the thought of two. Therefore he says in the law that this cannot be,
with the result that the hapless offspring are condemned to illegitimacy.
At least, however, the common-sense mandate that they be supported
59151 Fla. 241, 9 So.2d 363 (1942).
60157 Fla. 640, 26 So.2d 655 (1946).
61131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715 (1938).
62
CARSON, Op. cit. supra note 5, c. 8, §1.
63
The following figures from the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board
of Health show this relationship, the years selected being representative of the
trend:
YEAR

DIVORCES

ANNULMENTS

PERCENT

1927
3,775
17
.45
68
.86
1937
7,852
216
1.04
1947
20,703
1.19
1948
17,805
210
1949
17,631
179
1.02
64
The following breakdown of Florida annulments for the year 1949 has been
furnished by the State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Jacksonville,
and may be taken as representative:
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by their father is today accepted as essential; 65 and subsequent marriage of the parents, whenever legally possible, renders the children
6
legitimate"' even when based on nothing more than cohabitation. 7
Aside from bigamy, the Florida judiciary, although laboring under
the self-imposed restraint of couching its opinions in the void-voidable
terminology, has in fact emphasized the equity concept of fair play,
even at the cost of being thoroughly illogical. When there are two
living spouses and no children, the defrauded spouse is favored. When
there are children also, the emphasis shifts to the protection of them
and then to the duped spouse when possible. If that spouse is dead,
his or her heirs are favored as against the survivor in the absence of
children; but when these exist the major problem arises. If the marriage be declared voidable the heirs are powerless to rectify an obviously unjust situation; yet if it be held void the children are rendered
illegitimate.
It is submitted that a reappraisal of this outmoded division, probably
unsound from the beginning, is in order. When a bona fide purchaser
of marital realty relying on the validity of a void marriage can invoke
estoppel against heirs to secure mere property rights,68 it is high time
that the judicial conscience accord similar solicitude to the children.
The fact is that marriage, in any community, is no ordinary contract,
BY PLACE OF MIRRIAGE

NUMER OF
GROUND FOR ANNULMENT

Marriage not consummated
Impotency
Fraud, misrepresentation
Extreme cruelty
Coercion, duress, force, etc.
Intoxicated when married
Under age
Bigamy
Insanity
Other grounds, not stated
All Grounds

NOT STATED

ANNULMENTS

FLORIDA

OTh ER

13
3
67
13
3
14
6
46
4
10

3
0
20
3
0
0
0
11
1
2

10
3
47
9
3
14
6
33
3
5

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
3

179

40

133

6

65E.g., Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So.2d 279 (1942).
66F.. STAT. §742.05 (1949); see Stone v. Stone, 159 Fla. 624, 626, 32 So.2d
278, 279 (1947).
67
E.g., Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935).
68
E.g., Kerivan v. Fogel, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945).
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and that commercial law concepts when transplanted into this field
do not thrive. There is no practical reason why the status of children
and rights of inheritance should not have their day in court, regardless
of th- ,,ture of the iijipedina ,' to inarriae. Th dilemiam of an
ine\itable choice between illegitimacy of the offspring and legal impotence of the heirs of a surviving spouse is by no means necessary;
both results could readily be avoided as regards the same marriage.
Similar!y. ratification could be more effectively handled without the
void-voidable mumbo-jumbo.
Despite the greater popularity of divorce as a dissolution medium,
annulment is at times a unique remedy, for example, to terminate a
marriage contracted fraudulently, to dissolve at any time wedlock
entered into by one mentally incapable of understanding it, or to end
promptly a union brought about by duress. The social stigma of
divorce and the financial burden of alimony are generally eliminated.
A statute, however, is no sure-fire weapon of attack; in fact, a hastily
drafted bill could do far more harm than good. The first step required
is some clear thinking about legitimacy of children and their support,
about protection of elderly persons and their heirs from unscrupulous
adventurers, both male and female, and about those couples who
make honest yet stupid mistakes in this field, as in others. Acquiring
a wife and children should not be analogized to buying a house or
selling a citrus crop. The Florida decisions have in the main achieved
good practical results. What remains to be done is to apply in the
opinions principles that will fit the decisions.
MORTON H.

SILVER*

*Now a member of the Miami, Florida, Bar.
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